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Abstract
This Essay aims to examine the application of antitrust law to the conscious parallelism char-
acteristic of oligopolistic markets, with special emphasis on European Community and Italian
laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust systems have always encountered problems in mar-
kets with oligopolistic structures.' The greatest difficulty lies in
defining the oligopolistic market itself. It is commonly under-
stood as a market characterized by the presence of only a few
undertakings. An oligopolistic market thus figures halfway be-
tween a monopoly, where only one party provides the supply,
and an atomistic or perfect competition system, in which innu-
merable undertakings of all sizes operate.
In reality, oligopolistic markets behave in different man-
ners. Consequently, an oligopolistic market is more appropri-
ately defined as one that includes companies that are aware that
the decisions each of them makes are interdependent with those
made by other undertakings on the market.2 This characteristic
interdependence of undertakings seems typical of the market ex-
amined in this essay, in which the product is homogenous and
significant entry barriers make it particularly risky for other. com-
petitors to enter.
The petroleum market is commonly considered a typical
oligopolistic market. Indeed, the product in that market is sub-
stitutable, and demand is somewhat inflexible. Another signifi-
cant example is the mineral waters market, which was analyzed
in depth by the European Commission in the Nestld/Perrier case
and will be discussed below.3 In the mineral waters market the
product is also homogenous, and variations in price do not
greatly affect the level of demand.
* Partner Rucellai & Raffaelli, Milan, Italy. Chairman of the European Lawyers'
Union ("U.A.E."), Commission on Competition Law.
1. See George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L.
REv. 439 (1982); Robert F. Allen, Oligopoly, Tacit Collusion and the Problem of Proof Under
the Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST BULL., Fall 1981, at 487; Howard N. Ross, Oligopoly Theory
and Price Rigidity, ANTITRUST BULL., Summer 1987, at 451. The experience of the
United States is significant, as the first antitrust legislation was passed there. It greatly
inspired all other such legislation, including that of the European Community.
2. See MICHELE GRIU.LO & FRANCESCO SILVA, IMPREsA, CONCORRENZA E ORGANIZZA-
ZIONE 165 (1989).
3. See Commission Decision No. 92/553/EEC, O.J. L 356/1 (1992) [hereinafter
Nestl6/Perrier].
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In a market of this structure no single undertaking occupies
a dominant position that would enable it to act without regard to
the reactions of other operators on the market.4 Furthermore,
undertakings do not act freely in search of the greatest possible
profit, as they would in an atomistic market with perfect compe-
tition. Rather, an oligopolistic market is composed of relatively
few undertakings, whose primary concern is to study and predict
the conduct of their competitors, rather then the conduct of the
consumers. This is because undertakings in an oligopoly, unlike
those in a monopoly or an atomistic market, do not know how
the market will react to their decisions.5 In fact, much depends
on their competitors' reactions. For example, if an undertaking
decides to raise its prices, it may see its market share decrease as
a result. Accordingly, its competitors will acquire larger shares
of the market, unless they also increase their prices. Alterna-
tively, if its competitors do raise their prices as well, demand may
hold constant and profits may increase.
Economists have studied this type of market at great length.
It has been noted,' however, that theory plays a lesser role in
oligopolies than in monopolistic or atomistic markets, as an oli-
gopoly has several nuances in practice that make it nearly impos-
sible to establish universally applicable laws. Among the many
models that were developed to explain the function of oligo-
polistic markets, the Bertrand model is the most elementary and
the most significant for the purposes of this Essay.7 The Ber-
trand model focuses on an oligopolistic market formed by only
two undertakings of equal size and efficiency, that offer a nearly
identical product. These two undertakings engage in a price
competition, with the purpose of shifting customer demand
from one to the other. The model demonstrates that in such a
4. United Brands Company and United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commission of
the European Communities, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
According to the Court of Justice, an undertaking is in a dominant position when its
economic strength "enables it to prevent effective competition on the relevant market,
giving it the power to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently of its competi-
tors, its customers and ultimately, its consumers." United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 281,
[1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 430.
5. See STEFANO ZAMAGNI, ECONOMIA POLITICA 496 (1985).
6. See id. at 496. See also Anne Perrot & Louis Vogel, Entente tacite, oligopole et paralle-
lisme de comportement, inJURIS-CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE - LA SEMAINEJURIDIQUE, 48 Section
I, 229, 539 (1993) (discussing joint, economic, and legal analysis of oligopolistic mar-
ket).
7. See MICHELE POLO, TEORIA DELL'OLIGOPOLIO 17 (1993).
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situation, the price ultimately settles at the average variable cost
level, allowing for practically no profits.
The Bertrand model confirms that in a true oligopolistic
market each undertaking must focus primarily on the conduct of
its competitors and their reactions to each other's behavior. Fur-
thermore, price competition, which is encouraged by antitrust
law as the principal competitive instrument in atomistic markets,
is difficult to put into practice in an oligopolistic market.
The typical problem that undertakings must resolve in an
oligopolistic market is finding an equilibrium that permits them
to cohabitate on the market, in the absence of economic laws.
Once undertakings accept their interdependence, they conclude
that non-competition presents the most suitable environment.
Namely, it affords them a constant presence on the market, and
spares them from having to pay continuous attention to the con-
duct of other undertakings, or from worrying about technologi-
cal updating.' It is at this juncture that problems arise under
antitrust law, which aims to protect the game of competition in
the public interest. In this context, oligopolistic undertakings
can establish non-competitive positions in one of two ways: (1)
by engaging in true collusive behavior; or (2) by practicing so-
called intelligent or conscious parallelism, which translates into
adapting their conduct to that of their competitors.9 The first
case falls within the scope of antitrust law, which expressly for-
bids collusive practices. The second case, however, raises the
problem of applying antitrust law to conscious parallelism. It
should be emphasized that the effect on the market is identical:
8. See ZAMAGNI, supra note 5, at 516. In order to study the conduct of undertakings
in the oligopolistic market and explain the reasons for which oligopolistic markets inev-
itably lead to a non-competition position, economists have applied the so-called game
theory developed in the field of mathematics. This theory, which concerns moves and
countermoves, as particularly adapted to cases of interdependent conduct, such as that
of oligopolistic undertakings. Id. The Commission refers to game theory in its most
recent decision of November 30, 1994, in the Concrete case. Commission Decision No.
94/815/EEC, O.J. L 343/13 (1994) (Cement).
9. See Mario Franzosi, L'oligopolio e il dilemma del prigioniero, RIWSTA Di DIRITrO IN-
DusrRLALE, 1988, Pt. I at 58. Conscious or intelligent parallelism refers to conduct of
oligopolistic undertakings by means of which, based on experience gained through the
market, they conform their decisions even in the absence of any collusion. Id. In order
to explain this phenomenon through game theory, economists use the so-called pris-
oner's dilemma. Id. By means of this game one can understand why undertakings,
having understood their interdependence and the advantages offered by engaging in
certain uniform conduct, behave in the same manner. Id.
1996]
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whether an oligopoly is created through collusive practices or
through parallel conduct, competition is eliminated and thus
plays no regulatory role on the affected market."0 Antitrust legis-
lators and interpreters have difficulty in dealing with this situa-
tion because the structure of an oligopolistic market inevitably
leads to the elimination of competition, even' in the absence of
collusive practices.'I
This Essay aims to examine the application of antitrust law
to the conscious parallelism characteristic of oligopolistic mar-
kets, with special emphasis on European Community and Italian
laws. Although the goals of Italian law are different from those
of the European Community,'2 Italian law substantially reiterates
the provisions of the EEC Treaty". In addition, the last section
10. See Roberto Pardolesi, Parallelismo e collusione oligopolistica: it lato oscuro
dell'antitrust, FORO ITALIANO, 1995, Pt. IV at 65 et seq. (1994). "An oligopoly is capable of
defects which are quite similar to those for which monopolies are usually rebuked." Id.
at 71.
11. See Franzosi, supra note 9, at 60. The "inanity and impotence" of antitrust law
when faced with an oligopoly has already been demonstrated, while other authors have
recently defined parallelism as "the dark side" of antitrust. Id. See Pardolesi, supra note
10; Cristoforo Osti, Il lato oscuro dell'antitrust: qualche dubbio in pil, in FORO ITALIANO,
1994, Pt. V at 76-79 (1994).
12. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off.
1987). Community law, Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty gives antitrust regulations an
instrumental function aimed at pursuing the aims of the European Community, most
importantly that of the effective development of the single market. Id.
One of the essential aims of the EEC Treaty is the creation of a single market
in which producers may freely exercise and develop their businesses, and
where consumers can in their turn utilize products and services preselected by
virtue of their price and quality. In order to guarantee this freedom, Commu-
nity authorities aim primarily at creating a system which guarantees that com-
petition is not distorted in the common market.
Opinion of Advocate General Henri Mayras, Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] C.M.L.R.
557 [hereinafter ICI Case]. In Italian law, on the other hand, antitrust regulations have
the precise goal of protecting competition, in implementation of Article 41 of the Con-
stitution, which sanctions the right of economic initiative. See RAFFAELLA NIRO, PROFILI
COSTITUZIONALI DELLA DISCIPLINA ANTITRUST (1994). The need to redefine the purposes
of Community antitrust law now that the single market has been substantially realized
has been emphasized. DavidJ. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Compe-
tition Law?, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 97 (1994).
13. See EEC Treaty, supra note 12, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1.
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of Article 1 of Law 287/904 expressly provides that national anti-
trust laws must be interpreted based on principles of European
Community competition law. Thus, any examination of EC leg-
islation also lends itself to a discussion of Italian laws at a na-
tional level.
I. OLIGOPOLISTIC PARALLELISM AND PROHIBITION
OF AGREEMENTS
This section will examine whether parallel conduct moti-
vated by the inherent nature of an oligopolistic market is subject
to EC laws that aim to eliminate anti-competitive agreements.
Both Article 85 of the EC Treaty 5 and Article 2 of Law 287/906
prohibit undertakings from entering into agreements or engag-
ing in practices that are intended to restrict or consistently dis-
tort competition or that produce that result. As parallelism oc-
curs even in the absence of agreements among undertakings,
the issue focuses on whether practices of conscious parallelism
are comparable to "concerted practices."
EC case law has defined "concerted practice" as "a form of
coordinating undertaking activity that, without actually conclud-
ing a true agreement, in practice becomes a conscious collabora-
tion among said undertakings aimed at preventing competition,
which collaboration leads to abnormal competition on the mar-
ket...-, In particular, EC case law' 8 has stated that the criterion
for coordination must be interpreted according to the concept
of the antitrust provisions set forth in the EC Treaty, so that
"each economic operator must determine independently the
policy he intends to adopt on the common market."' 9
14. Legge 10 Ottobre 1990, n.287 (in Gazzetta Ufficiale, 13 Ottobre 1990, n.240)
- Norme Per La Tutela Della Concorrenza E Del Mercato.
15. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 85, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 626 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
16. See Legge 10 Ottobre 1990, supra note 14.
17. Cooperatieve bereniging "Suiker Unie" UA and Others v. Commission of the
European Communities, Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50,54 to 56, 111, 113 & 114/73, [1975]
E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295 [hereinafter Suicker Decision].
18. Suicker Decision, [1975] E.C.R. at 1943, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 297.
19. Id.
1996] 919
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Based on this case law, a concerted practice exists20 when
the following conditions are met: (1) there must be a form of
coordination or practical cooperation between undertakings
that replaces their independent action; (2) this coordination
needs to be achieved through direct or indirect contact; and (3)
the aim must be to remove, in advance, any uncertainty as to the
future conduct of their competitors. On the other hand, con-
scious parallelism results from undertakings' experience in an
oligopolistic market, which by its very nature restricts competi-
tion, especially with respect to price. The comparison of con-
certed practices to conscious parallelism is problematic21 be-
cause it may lead to the repression of individual conduct by
oligopolistic undertakings, such as the decision to make one's
prices uniform with the others. Furthermore, this repression
may occur even in the absence of the abuses that trigger the ap-
plication of antitrust provisions against a monopolistic or domi-
nant undertaking.
The Court ofJustice rendered its first opinion in this regard
in the ICI v. Commission case, where it reviewed a Commission
decision 21 that had considered it implausible that the undertak-
ings in question would have been able to raise the prices of their
substantially interchangeable products numerous times, simulta-
neously and uniformly without previous agreement. Although it
denied the undertakings' appeal, the Court declared that con-
scious parallelism in itself is not a concerted practice. It may,
nevertheless, constitute a "serious index" of concerted action, if
it leads to competitive practices that are inconsistent with nor-
mal market conditions, taking into consideration the nature of
the products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the
volume of the market itself. According to the Court, this occurs
when parallel conduct permits undertakings to establish a price
equilibrium at a different level than that which would be war-
ranted by a competitive system "as well as to crystallize the posi-
tions they attain, to the detriment of the effective free circula-
20. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JFAN-FRANcoI BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 21
(1990); CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETI-
TION 93 (1993); RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAw 194 (1993); ALDO FRIGNANI, ET. AL.,
DIRrrro ANTITRUST ITALIANO 168 (1993).
21. See Pardolesi, supra note 10, at 72.
22. ICI Case, [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557.
23. Commission Decision No. 69/243/EEC, O.J. L 195/11 (1969) (Dyestuffs).
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tion of goods in the common market and the consumers' free
choice of suppliers." 24 Although the Court distinguished be-
tween conscious parallelism and concerted practices, it did not
completely eliminate the possibility of extending the scope of
Article 85(1) prohibitions to conscious parallelism as well.
Both the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 25
have recently revisited this issue, and confirmed the ICI decision.
The Court of Justice partially overruled the Commission's deci-
sion in the Woodpulp case, 26 which had found that price parallel-
ism, facilitated by the quarterly notice of prices published in the
specialized press, constituted concerted practice. The Court ap-
pointed experts to prepare an economic report to determine
whether price parallelism had actually occurred. More impor-
tantly, the report was also intended to indicate whether this
would lead to a differentiated or uniform price structure, by
means of an analysis that considered the natural functioning of
the market in question. The Court-appointed experts thus re-
ported that: (a) the system of price notices met the needs of the
specific market; and (b) the price notices were simultaneous due
to the great transparency of the market, achieved through mul-
tifirm agents, dynamism in the specialized press, etc. According
to the experts, price parallelism therefore did not arise from
concerted practices, but rather, was the result of normal market.
functions. Based on this expert report, the Court held that price
parallelism could be explained as something other than con-
21certed action. In particular, it was deemed a result of the
oligopolistic tendencies of the market in question. Conse-
quently, the Court partially reversed the Commissions decision.
Thus, the principle seems to be that whenever parallelism
may have an economic explanation related to the oligopolistic
structure of the market, the presumption that it results from
concerted action can be clearly overcome. The Court uses a
24. ICI Case, [1972] E.C.R. at 656, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 597.
25. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A AhIstrom Oy and Others v. EC Commission, Joined
Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C116-117/85 & C125-129/85, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R.
407 (United Kingdom intervening in cases C-114/85 & C125-129/85). Re Italian Flat
Glass: Societa Italiano Vetro SpA and Others (United Kingdom intervening on Article
86 Grounds) v. EC Commission (United Kingdom intervening on Article 85 grounds),
Joined Cases T-68/69 & T77-78/89, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302, FORO ITALIANO, 1992, Pt. IV
at 433 (providing note by Roberto Pardolesi).
26. Commission Decision No. 85/202/EEC, OJ. L 85/1 (1984) (Wood Pulp).
27. Id.
19961
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rather efficient compromise solution that preserves the possibil-
ity of proving concerted practice by demonstrating parallelism,28
while at the same time, recognizing that oligopolistic markets
may inherently engender parallelism. Therefore, mere proof of
simple parallelism, when it may have an economic justification,
will not automatically constitute concerted action. 9
The burden of proof regarding the existence of market fac-
tors that could justify parallelism, however, is rather ambiguous.
The Woodpulp ruling seems to affirm the principle that the Com-
mission must show that concerted action is the only possible ex-
28. As Roberto Pardolesi states in his note to the decision of the Court of First
Instance on October 24, 1991, in the Polipropilene case, the Court's decision is remark-
able given the scarce visibility of cartels, as it makes it possible to strike at cartels without
necessarily having to provide full proof written proof of the agreement. FORO ITALIANO,
1992, Pt. V at 121.
29. Id. 11 175, 191, at 116, 132. In the conclusions of Attorney General of the EC
Court ofJustice, Marco Darmon, he stated that for concerted action to exist, the under-
takings' knowledge of each other's conduct must stem from communications between
the undertakings, and not simply from the fact that they have monitored the .market.
Id. It follows that in oligopolistic markets all conduct which, by facilitating communica-
tion among undertakings (facilitating practices), makes it easier and more possible to
respond to another's conduct, should be examined very closely. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS,
supra note 20 at 29. It is also asserted that the solution to the "age-old problem of
oligopolistic parallelism" may be found in "a clear prohibition on engaging in facilitat-
ing practices" because "without the adoption of facilitating practices it is quite difficult
for undertakings to coordinate a restriction of competition." Cristoforo Osti, Rl controUo
giuridico dell'oligopolio, I GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 580 (1993) [hereinafter I con-
trollo giuridico]. In effect, the position of Community authorities seems favorable to a
similar interpretation, as it has proved to be stricter in evaluating the exchange of infor-
mation in cases of oligopolistic structures or structures that tend to oligopoly. See Com-
mission Decision No. 87/1/EEC, O.J. L 3/17 (1986) (Fatty Acids); Commission Deci-
sion No. 92/157/EEC, OJ. L 68/19 (1992) (UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Ex-
change); BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 20, at 198. Exchanges of information involving
prices have been found to be in potential conflict with competition laws. Commission
Decision No. 74/292/EEC, OJ. L 160/1 (1974) (IFTRA Glass Containers). Agree-
ments on information involving costs have also been found to be in potential conflict
with competition laws. Commission Decision No. 75/497/EEC, O.J. L 228/3 (1975)
(IFTRA Rules for Producers of Virgin Aluminum). Agreements on investments have
also been found to be in potential conflict with competition laws. Commission Deci-
sion No. 84/405/EEC, O.J. L 220/27 (1984) (Zinc Producer Group). Other confiden-
tial information such as commercial strategies, production forecasts, etc, may also vio-
late competition laws. At present one may thus state that when confidential informa-
tion is exchanged, conscious parallelism will certainly be considered the result of
concerted action, although there may eventually be another plausible explanation for
it. In particular, in Enichem Anic Spa v. EC Commission, Case 7/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1623,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R 84, the Court of First Instance held that when there is evidence that
the undertakings have held meetings regarding prices, there is no need to provide evi-
dence of parallel conduct or implementation of price initiatives.
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planation for parallelism.3" The subjectivity entailed in the eval-
uation of potential economic justifications for parallelism, how-
ever, makes this analysis somewhat uncertain.31
Consequently, prohibitions on agreements play a limited
role in preventing the natural conduct of undertakings in an
oligopolistic market. Namely, competitors may still engage in
parallel practices and avoid the scope of agreement prohibitions
by unilaterally determining their conduct without exchanging
confidential information. In this regard, it has been found 2
that antitrust laws on agreements prohibit the distortion of com-
petition engendered by non-competition agreements, but do not
require undertakings to compete. Considering the present state
of antitrust legislation, this compromise seems correct. We shall
later see if it suits the public interest.
Difficulties arise when undertakings in an oligopolistic mar-
ket not only align their prices without entering into collusive
agreements, but also fix non-competitive prices. In the absence
of price-fixing agreements, an undertaking is normally free to
establish its prices at the desired level, even if those prices clearly
exceed its costs. Thus, the legitimacy of conscious parallelism
could shield anti-competitive practices, such as uniform price
fixing, from antitrust laws that consider them contrary to con-
sumer welfare and against public interest.
II. ABUSE OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANT POSITION
Antitrust regulations such as Article 86 of the EC Treaty33
and Article 3 Law 287/90,3' expressly prohibit a dominant un-
dertaking from abusing its position by charging excessively high
30. See Woodpulp, O.J. L 85/1, at 126 (1984). In Compagnie Royale Asturienne des
Mines SA and Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 29
& 30/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1679, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 688, the Court seems to lay the burden
of proof on the Commission. In any case, if the undertaking demonstrates that the
parallelism may be justified by something other than concerted action, the presump-
tion is overcome.
31. In the ICI Case, [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557, the experts appointed
by the Commission and the various undertakings analyzed the characteristics of the
coloring materials market and came to diametrically opposite positions.
32. See Pietro Trimarchi, II problema giuridico delle pratiche concordate fra oligopolisti,
RmIsTA DELLE SOCIETA 3 (1969).
33. EC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
34. See Legge 10 Ottobre 1990, supra note 14.
1996]
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prices compared to its costs. 5 An investigation of the possibility
of applying the aforesaid regulations should begin by examining
whether a dominant position can be discerned within a classic
oligopolistic market. 6 In this regard, it is certainly impossible to
identify a single undertaking in a dominant position. Such an
entity would have to be able to act alone in the market, in such
an independent manner that it need pay no attention to reac-
tions of customers, competitors, or consumers. This situation is
incompatible with the nature of a classic oligopoly and its char-
acteristic interdependence among undertakings, which prevents
even the market price leader from assuming a dominant posi-
tion by itself.
An indifference to reactions of consumers and minor com-
petitors may, however, be characteristic of an oligopolistic mar-
ket with respect to the group of undertakings engaged in con-
scious 'parallelism. These entities enjoy a dominant position
compared to the other undertakings remaining on the market.
The oligopolistic dominators set their prices, therefore, by tak-
ing into consideration only other oligopolistic undertakings,
without regard to the minor undertakings on the market.
Nevertheless, the definition of collective dominant position,
which is the particular position of powerjointly held on the mar-
ket by a number of undertakings, has had a hard time gaining
acceptance. This difficulty persists despite the literal reference
in Article 86 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits "any abuse by one
or more undertakings" of a dominant position on the market.
In fact, some scholars have asserted that "more undertakings"
who lack individual autonomy could create a collective domi-
nant position only when they jointly establish a single economic
unit. 7 This theory, however, did not take into account the fact
35. EC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 86(a), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627. Article 86(a) of
the EC Treaty expressly provides that an abuse may consist of charging unfair prices. Id.
In addition, the difficulty of setting criteria based upon which the "fairness" of a price
may be determined has been noted, given that it is practically impossible for the Au-
thority in charge of controlling and protecting competition to transform into a sort of
"price observatory" for purposes of establishing what price each undertaking should
properly charge. II controllo giuridico, supra note 29, at 592. See Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, Fifth Report on Competition Policy 13 (1976).
36. See United Brands Company and United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commis-'
sion of the European Communities, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R.
429 (defining dominant position).
37. See Enrico Adriano Raffaelli, I concetto di 'unica entitd economica' nella giuri-
sprudenza comunitaria, RIWSTA DI DuM-ro INDUSTRUALE, 1977, Pt. II at 396 (1977).
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that EC law considers any entity which is in all respects autono-
mous to be an "undertaking"3 ' and that undertakings which to-
gether constitute a single economic unit are no longer autono-
mous in this sense. The conditions under which a number of
undertakings could be considered to be in a collective dominant
position, that is, the particular relationships or links required be-
tween one another, were not clear.
By the late 1980's, however, the definition of collective dom-
inant position began to make headway in the administrative case
law of the Commission. 9 This progress was consistent with the
development of oligopolies resulting from the globalization of
markets, and the increasing need of undertakings to become
large enough to exploit economies of scale.4"
In the Flat Glass decision,41 the Commission held that the
three principal undertakings operating in the Italian flat glass
market were in a "collective dominant position," based on the
following: (i) the particular concentration of the market at issue
(the three undertakings jointly held a market share between
79% and 95%, depending on the type of glass); (ii) the long-
term stability of the market shares; (iii) the high degree of inter-
dependence among the undertakings; (iv) the indifference to
competition from other undertakings present on the market and
the high barriers to entry due to "significant investments re-
quired in order to exercise this industrial activity and the pros-
38. See Poucet v. Assurances Gonrales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Rkgionale
du Languedoc-Roussillon,Joined Cases C-159 & 160/91 (Eur. CLJ. Feb. 17, 1993) (not
yet reported) (providing definition of undertaking in case law of Court ofJustice); Pis-
tre v. Caisse Autonome Nationale de Compensation de I'Assurance Vieilleuse des Arti-
sans, in FORo ITALIANO, 1994, Pt. IV at 113 (with a note by Luigi Scudiero: La nozione di
impresa nella giurispndenza della Corte di Giustizia); SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Organi-
sation Europ~ene pour la Scurit6 de la Navigation A~rienne, Case C 364/92 (Eur. CL
J.Jan. 19, 1994), in FoRO ITALIANO, 1994, Pt. IV at 297 et seq. (with note by Luciano Di
Via, Brevi note sul criterio di economicit e l'imprewa 7ievante per il dititto della concorrenza nella
recente giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia).
39. See Commission of the European Communities, Fifth Report on Competition
Policy 13 (1976). Nevertheless, even in the 5th Report on competition policy, in its
investigation of the conduct of oil companies in the Community from October 1973 to
March 1974, the Commission comments on ... the collective dominant position .... "
held by'refinery companies. Id. at 15 ss.
40. See SALVATORE VIcAJi, NUOVE DIMENSION! DELLA CONCORRENZA - STRATEGIE NEI
MERCATI SENZA CONFINI (1989) (examining effects of evolving market trends on competi-
tion).
41. Commission Decision No. 89/93/EEC, O.J. L 33/44 (1988) (Flat Glass).
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pect of a weak increase in demand for the next ten years" ;42 and
(v) the structural links among the undertakings, established
through systematic exchanges of products, which constitute a
tool for preserving their respective market positions and the re-
lationships of strength existing among the undertakings them-
selves.
In the ruling that followed the challenge to the Commis-
sion's decision, the Court of First Instance partially overturned
the decision due to lack of evidence.4" The Court, nevertheless,
confirmed the possibility of the existence of a collective domi-
nant position, which the Court seemed to feel was established
more through economic ties among the undertakings than
through the structure of the market itself.
Thus, the Flat Glass ruling finally overcame the theory that a
collective dominant position could not exist among independ-
ent undertakings. The decision, however, seemed to require
particular economic links, which were supplied in this case by
making "a technological advantage" mutually available through
"means of an agreement or license."" Point 359 of the decision
also refers to the maritime cartels "which permit such economic
links so that they jointly hold a dominant position with the other
operators in the same market."45
Although the Flat Glass ruling was more progressive, it was
not sufficient to bring oligopolistic undertakings that engage in
parallel conduct within the definition of collective dominant po-
sition. This was because it was not clear whether simple parallel-
42. Id. O.J. L 33/44, at 49, 5 (1988).
43. Id.
44. The Court of First Instance in fact states at point 358:
There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic
entities from being, on a specific market, united by some economic links that,
by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant position vis-4-vis the other
operators on the same market. This could be the case, for example, where two
or more independent undertakings jointly have, through agreements or
licenses, a technological lead affording them the power to behave to an appre-
ciable extent independently of their competitors, their customers and ulti-
mately of their consumers.
FoRo ITALIANO, 1992, Pt. IV at 433 (with note by Roberto Pardolesi), GIURISPRUDENZA
COMMERCI-LE, Vol. II at 615 (1993) (with note by Giorgia Masina, Osservazioni a Trib. di
Primo Grado CE, 10 mano 1992, in tema di posizione dominante collettiva).
45. See Pardolesi, supra note 10 at 435. Pardolesi emphasizes that the Court of First
Instance rejects the idea that a finding, of collective dominant position must first run
the "gauntlet of lack of economic independence." Id.
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ism should in itself be considered an "economic link" that would
justify finding a collective dominant position. In this regard, it
should be noted that during the proceedings the Commission
repeatedly declared that it had not based its finding of a collec-
tive dominant position on simple parallelism, but rather on par-
ticular economic links among undertakings in the sector.'
The Commission's position became clearer with the Nestli!
Perrier decision on the French oligopolistic mineral waters mar-
ket.4 7 There, the Commission focused exclusively on the paral-
lelism exhibited by a group of undertakings that held a joint
market share of 82%, to find that they enjoyed a collective domi-
nant position.48
The Nestli/Perrier decision showed that the Commission can
derive the existence of a collective dominant position solely from
the fact that a few undertakings, protected by strong entry barri-
ers, coexist on the market without actually competing. For pur-
poses of our examination, this decision represents a decisive step
towards applying antitrust law to oligopolistic market situations.
This makes it possible to prohibit abuses of dominant positions
in oligopolistic markets and also facilitates the enforcement of
regulations on concentrations, which will be discussed below.
Based on the Commission's interpretation of Article 86 of the
EC Treaty, particularly in light of the theory of collective domi-
nant position, it seems possible to exercise control over tight oli-
46. Flat Glass, O.J. L 33/44 at pt. 350.
47. Nestl6/Perrier, O.J. L 356/1 (1992).
48. See Guido Iannuzzi, Una svolta nel'antitrust: la posizione dominante oligopolistica,
GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIaLE, Vol. I at 778 (1994). In addition to the Nestil3Perrier
case, O.J. L 356/1 (1992), the Commission found a collective dominant position in
other cases. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 93/82/EEC, O.J. L 34/20 (1992)
(Cewal). In the Cewal case, for example, the Commission found the following to be
indicative of a collective dominant position: (a) a market share of over 70%; (b) availa-
bility of a market share considerably superior to that of its leading competitor; (c) serv-
ices decidedly more developed than those of its leading competitor; and (d) experience
acquired over the years. Id. Based on all these elements, the Commission held that the
members of the Cewal maritime cartel jointly held a dominant position "as a result of
the cartel agreement which unites them and which creates extremely close economic
links among them." Id. The "Autorit Garante," the Italian Antitrust Authority, found
the existence of a collective dominant position in the APCA/COMPAG. Decision 558/
92, Bollettino dell' Atitoriti Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 13/92. The Authority
also found a collective dominant position in the Centro Italiano Gpl. Decision 1087/
93, in Bollettino dell'Autoritd Garante della Concorenvza e del Mercato 8/93. Giovanni Cavani
comments on these decisions in "Abusi di posizione dominante," in Concorrenza e Mer-
cato, 1993, no. 1 at 77.
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gopoly markets. Such supervision aims to prevent undertakings
in oligopolistic markets from manipulating their non-competi-
tive dominant positions so as to abuse the balance achieved on
the market. As it has also been noted,4 9 the definition of a col-
lective dominant position has the additional advantage of per-
mitting a more expansive application of merger regulations.
III. CONTROL OVER CONCENTRATIONS IN
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
In implementing Article 3(f) of the EC Treaty, and in ac-
cordance with the purposes set forth in Article 2,50 the Council
of the European Communities has adopted a Regulation 51 that
gives the Commission control over concentrations with EC
dimensions. This Regulation aims to facilitate the institution of
"a system ensuring that competition on the common market is
not distorted."52 It establishes that only those concentrations
"which do not create or strengthen a dominant position as a re-
sult of an actual and significant obstruction of competition in
the common market" may be declared compatible with the com-
mon market.5" The Regulation is thus intended to "maintain
and develop effective competition within the common mar-
ket."
5 4
Prior to this legislation, the European Community had pro-
hibited abuses of a dominant position through Article 86, but
not the dominant position itself. By means of this Regulation,
legislators who were conscious of the difficulties engendered by
a major economic power on the market, prepared the tools for
preventing such market positions from developing. The idea
49. See Pardolesi, supra note 10 at 70; lannuzzi, supra note 48 at 781.
50. EEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1.
Article 2 of the EEC Treaty states that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it.
Id.
51. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 395/1 (1989) (dealing with con-
trol of concentrations).
52. Id. OJ.L. 900/1, at 1 (1989).
53. Id. art. 2, OJ. L 900/1, at 3 (1989).
54. Id. art. 2(1)(a), OJ. L 900/1, at 2 (1989).
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was to allow the dominant positions that form naturally on the
market due to contingent situations or particular en-
trepreneurial skill, while discouraging their formation through
concentrations.
The definition of collective dominant position is important
in this area as well. It enables the authorities responsible for
controlling concentrations to prevent their creation in markets
that are already highly concentrated. The market share to be
considered in deciding whether a planned market concentration
creates or strengthens a dominant position consists of the aggre-
gate shares held by the undertakings directly involved, not of the
individual undertaking.55 Thus, the aggregate market share
clearly indicates when a planned concentration runs afoul of an-
titrust law by intending to strengthen a dominant position.56
The Commission has already had occasion to use the defini-
tion of collective dominant position in applying regulations gov-
erning mergers. In the Thorn Emi/Virgin case, the problem was
simply stated. 7 The Commission was faced with the planned ac-
quisition of a small undertaking by one of the largest record
companies in the world. Despite the fact that "the structural fea-
tures of the market for recorded music could indicate a situa-
tion of collective dominance," the Commission held that the
concentration was compatible with the common market. 5 Ac-
cording to the Commission, "the proposed acquisition would
not create or strengthen a dominant position among the five ma-
jor record companies as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded in the common market or a sub-
stantial part of it."59 The Commission arrived at its ruling in
light of the investigations it performed on the market and in
spite of the undoubted increase in concentration caused by the
elimination of Virgin from the market. Therefore, there is no
doubt that the Commission used the idea of collective dominant
position in this case in order to determine the lawfulness or un-
lawfulness of the planned concentration.
55. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 51, O.J. L 395/1 (1989).
56. Id.
57. Commission Decision of April 27, 1992, Case No. IV/M202 (Thorn Emi/Vir-
gin Music) (unpublished).
58. Id. at pt. 21.
59. Id. at pt. 68.
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In the NestM/Perrier case,6 0 the Commission concretely ap-
plied the definition of collective dominant position and held
that the French mineral water market was an oligopolistic mar-
ket characterized by the presence of three undertakings. The
Commission based its ruling on the fact that: Nestle, Perrier and
BSN alone controlled about 80% of the market; entry barriers
such as high transport costs and high advertising investment
costs offered strong protection; and, the almost total absence of
price competition, as well as the high degree of transparency ex-
hibited by the mineral water market.61 The NestM/Perrier case
presented a situation of high market concentration in which
competition by other small undertakings operating on the mar-
ket did not influence price policies, allowing the three major un-
dertakings to constantly increase their prices. Thus, the Com-
mission held that a sic et simpliciter authorization of the concen-
tration planned by Nestle and Perrier would have permitted
Nest6 and BSN to further reduce the already limited degree of
competition on the market. Moreover, it would have further re-
duced retailers' potential choices, as well as constituted a further
impediment to the entry of new operators on the market.62
In conclusion, according to the Commission, the planned
concentration would have permitted the creation of a symmetri-
cal duopolistic dominant position, given the similar size of the
two undertakings. Therefore, the Commission observed that
since "the safeguarding of effective competition is one of the
principal objectives of the Treaty (Article 3(f)). . . limitations
placed on effective competition which are prohibited if they re-
60. Nest6/Perrier, O.J. L 356/1 (1992).
61. Id. at pts. 61-62 (1992). According to the Commission (see points 61-62),
prices were fixed above the competitive level, and with respect to transparency, the
Commission notes that the three undertakings in question a) publish their price lists,
with discounts for basic quantities, b) supply the same customers, and c) inform the
Chambre Syndacale des Eaux Minerales of their monthly sales volumes, and each of
them receives information on quantities sold monthly by the other suppliers, broken
down by brands. Id.
62. Id. at pts. 90 & 96 (1992). With respect to potential competition, the Commis-
sion analyzed the significant obstacles and risks for eventual new operators, noting the
discount policies that the three national suppliers used to tie purchasers to the entire
range of their products, as well as the good reputation of Nestl, Perrier and BSN
brands and the fairly static demand. In this regard, the Commission notes the mutually
violent reaction of Nestle and BSN to IFINT's (Agnelli group) public offer for EXOR
(Perrier) as a demonstration of their intent to prevent the entry of new operators who
might disturb the structure of the existing market. Id. at pt. 98.
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suit in a dominant position held by a single undertaking do not
become lawful when they are due to more than one undertak-
ing."63 The Commission then authorized the concentration
under certain conditions, based primarily on Nestl6's obligation
to sell certain trademarks to a third party competitor. The sales
would ensure that the collective dominant position already pres-
ent on the market would not be further reinforced and a duo-
polistic dominant position would not be created.'
The Nestli/Perrier decision evidences the Commission's in-
tent to exert its control over oligopolistic markets and markets
with oligopolistic tendencies. The Commission was concerned
about the creation of a dominant duopolistic position in which
undertakings of similar sizes would not have been able to com-
pete with each other. Those undertakings would then be moti-
vated to maximize profits by engaging in anti-competitive paral-
lel behavior, despite the inflexible nature of demand with re-
spect to prices and substantially equivalent costs. According to
the Commission, this situation could only result in tacit parallel
conduct, which would cause price increases to the detriment of
consumers.
In light of the Commission's position in NestM/Perrier, Regu-
lation 4064/8965 on concentrations, like Article 3 of Law 287/
90,66 can be effectually used not only to prevent a single under-
63. Id. at pt. 113. By means of this statement the Commission intended to fully
reject those theories according to Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art. 2, 1 3, O.J. L
395/1 on concentrations would not affect collective dominant positions. See Council
Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 51, O.J. L 395/1 (1989) (dealing with control of
concentrations). And in this regard the Commission justly observes that various na-
tional antitrust systems (French, British and German law) have a system for controlling
concentrations which is applicable to both an oligopolistic dominion and to domina-
tion by individual undertakings. And the Commission held that this consideration bore
witness that Article 2, paragraph 3 of Regulation 4064/89 was applicable to a collective
dominant position, as it would appear odd that the mere fact that the transaction was of
Community relevance would cause it to escape the control to which it would certainly
otherwise be subject by domestic law. The main foreign antitrust laws are published in
the book by GIUSEPPE SENA & MARio FRANzosi, ANTITRUST (PROGETri ITALIANI, REGOLA-
MENTO C.E.E., LEGISLAZIONI STRANIERE) (1990).
64. See Commission Decision No. 92/385/EEC, OJ. L 204/1 (1992) (Accor/
Wagon-lits). The Commission authorized a concentration on the restaurant market
subject to the obligation of the acquiring company to sell one of the businesses of the
company acquired. Id.
65. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 51, O.J. L 395/1 (1989) (dealing
with control of concentrations).
66. Legge 10 Ottobre 1990, supra note 14.
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taking from acquiring or reinforcing an individual dominant po-
sition, but also to avoid the creation of collective dominant posi-
tions in an oligopolistic market or the strengthening of already
existing collective dominant positions. Regulation 4064/89 thus
avoids the creation of market positions where parallelism is the
only rational conduct for undertakings present on the market.
Authorities in charge of controlling concentrations must ex-
amine the various elements of the specific market on a case by
case basis, in order to establish whether the particular concentra-
tion may lead to unlawful results. This is a complex examina-
tion, necessarily based on an economic analysis of the market;
the decision in the NestM/Perrier case is significant in this re-
gard.67
IV. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The preceding discussion illustrates how EC antitrust regu-
lations and their nearly identical Italian counterparts may serve
to control excesses and concentrations in oligopolistic markets,
but seem inadequate in dealing with the normal consequences
of an oligopolistic market. In fact, under current legislation the
only possible actions by antitrust authorities are those which re-
sult from the application of provisions involving the control of
concentrations. 68 These actions center on the concept of collec-
tive dominant position and the prohibition against abuse of a
dominant position.
Authorities in charge of safeguarding competition may in-
tervene in order to prevent an oligopolistic market from further
increasing its degree of concentration. Similarly, they may act to
prevent oligopolistic undertakings in a collective dominant posi-
tion from abusing their position. In cases of excessive prices,
intervention appears extremely difficult given the demonstrated
practical impossibility of showing the "unfairness" of the prices.
At first sight, this power to intervene may seem sufficient,
but upon closer examination it proves inadequate. This is due
67. See CHRISTOPHER JONES & ENRIQUE GONZALES-DfAZ, THE E.E.C. MERGER REGU-
LATION 174 (1992) (giving exhaustive list of factors which may be taken into account in
order to establish existence of dominant oligopolistic position).
68. See Osti, supra note 29, at 603. According to Cristoforo Osti, concentration
transactions which occur within an oligopolistic market should be prohibited; the au-
thor in fact considers concentrations in an oligopolistic market to be a "facilitating
practice," and in fact the "facilitating practice" par excellence. Id.
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in part to the difficulties inherent in the economic analysis of
the markets, which must be turned over to experts who will have
the final say in deciding on the merits. It is also a consequence
of demonstrated impossibility of identifying abuses regarding
the price factor, which is the major concern of consumers. The
real problem, however, is that current laws seem effectively pow-
erless against the normal structure of an oligopolistic market.
This is because parallelism per se is not affected by current law.
Consequently, current laws do not deal with the typical
problems of an oligopolistic market. Such a market allows no
competition, causing its undertakings to stagnate for lack of mo-
tivation to engage in technological innovation.69 Undertakings
thus become primarily concerned with creating a common front
to prevent new operators from entering the market and dis-
turbing their comfortable situation. Competition, however, is
considered a market regulator that serves the public interest.
Nevertheless, it is hard to contest the fact that antitrust law,
which is institutionally aimed at safeguarding the game of com-
petition, seems to refuse to act against oligopolistic markets. At
the same time, those are the very markets that are becoming in-
creasingly important and widespread.
This is not an acceptable result. When a market becomes
oligopolistic due to increasing concentration, it can result in sit-
uations of non-competition that are opposed in other markets.
Still, while this is doubtless the situation with respect to current
antitrust law in the European Union and in Italy, there is, never-
theless, no reason to believe that matters must inevitably end
here. In this regard, the British experience is quite important,
as the national antitrust law70 is characterized by significant prag-
69. Id. at 603 n.42. Osti emphasizes the relevance of the problem of technological
growth in dormant oligopolistic markets, especially when "one considers the fact that
technological growth is capable of rapidly dissipating the negative static effects of mar-
ket concentration." Id.
70. Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 (Eng.); Fair Trading Act 1973 (Eng.). Ar-
ticle 6 of the Fair Trading Act finds the following situation to be similar to a monopoly
when:
[A]t least one quarter of all the goods of that description which are supplied
in the United Kingdom are supplied by members of one and the same group
consisting of two or more such persons.., or are supplied by members of one
and the same group consisting of two or more such persons... (not being a
group of interconnected bodies corporate) who whether voluntarily or not
and whether by agreement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any
way to prevent, restrict or distort competition in connection with the produc-
1996]
934 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:915
matism. The authority in charge of controlling competition,
called the Monopolies and Mergers Commission ("MMC") has
the power to perform investigations in any sector in which it
feels that the practices engaged in by operators present on the
market are contrary to the public interest. Once it finds that, as
in the case of an oligopolistic market, operators have not en-
tered into an agreement or engaged in a concerted practice, but
nevertheless behaved in a manner that conflicts with the eco-
nomic interest of consumers, the MMC may take one of two ac-
tions. It may order a halt to said conduct, or give recommenda-
tions aimed at encouraging the development of competition
within oligopolistic markets, without inflicting sanctions. In this
respect, the Fair Trading Act of 1973 even grants the Secretary of
State power to order the sale of a business, giving him the ability
to forcibly deconcentrate the market. 71
In effect, many of the investigations carried out by the MMC
have involved oligopolistic markets 72 and have led to recommen-
dations for changes in conduct, and sometimes even structural
changes. Some of the investigations of oligopolistic markets
have involved price alignment, which the MMC considers preju-
dicial to consumer interests when it does not correspond to par-
allelism of costs. Other investigations have involved prices that
are considered excessive. The solutions suggested by the MMC
in individual cases have ranged from price control, to monitor-
ing of the market, to requesting purchasers to better exercise
their power during the purchase phase.73 The lesson to be
learned from the British experience is that antitrust legislation
must not necessarily grind to a halt in the face of difficulties in-
herent in oligopolistic markets. Rather, tools can be created to
restore a certain level of competition even in the tightest oligo-
tion or supply of goods of that description, whether or not they themselves are
affected by the competition and whether the competition is between persons
interested as producers or suppliers or between persons interested as custom-
ers of producers or suppliers.
Id. art. 6.
71. Id. art. 56. For the combined provisions of Article 56 and part II of Schedule 8
of the Fair Trading Act of 1973, "An order may provide for the division of any business
by the sale of any part of the undertaking or assets, or otherwise... or for the division
of any group of interconnected bodies corporate . . ." Id.
72. See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 479 (1993).
73. Id. at 481. Whish explains in detail the interventions which the Secretary of
State has made in oligopolistic markets upon suggestion of the MMC. Id.
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polistic markets."'
Taking into consideration the demonstrated impossibility of
fitting an oligopoly within a framework of general rules, as well
as the practically inevitable situation of non-competitive stability
that is always created in oligopolistic markets, especially when
they are mature, the pragmatic approach suggested by the Brit-
ish experience seems almost obligatory. It ensures that the ben-
efits of competition, that antitrust legislation aims to protect, will
not be totally absent in oligopolistic markets, which are bound to
increase in number. The risk is that without legislative changes,
EC and Italian antitrust authorities will actively enforce antitrust
rules in markets with perfect competition where many small to
medium size undertakings operate, and accept the same situa-
tions in oligopolistic markets where operators are generally large
in size. This would be a truly unacceptable situation.
It should be noted that the EC Commission already seems
to have moved in the direction taken by British legislation, by
authorizing the Nestli/Perrier concentration upon condition that
Nestle make some divestments that would enable another party
to enter the market. Thus, the Commission avoided the forma-
tion of a duopolistic dominant position, which would have elimi-
nated all remaining competition in a market already character-
ized by strong parallelism. Community and Italian legislative re-
form must move in this direction in order to guarantee the
future of antitrust law, which will be increasingly called upon to
safeguard the game of competition in oligopolistic markets.
74. In this regard, it should be recalled that even Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
French antitrust law (ordinance no. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986, amended by Law no.
87/499 of July 1, 1987), which makes it possible for the Council of State to regulate
prices by decree after consultation with the Competition Council "dans les secteurs ou
le zones oft la concurrence par les prix est limit en raison soit de situations de mono-
pole ou de difficult&s durables d'approvisionnement, soit de dispositions 16gislatives ou
riglementaires." Ordinance no. 86-1243 (Dec. 1, 1986) (Fr.).
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